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CATEGORIES:CERF and CF Events
SUMMARY:Strategic Disclosure with Fake and Real News - Ila
 n Guttman (NYU Stern0
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250130T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250130T133000
UID:TALK218377AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/218377
DESCRIPTION:We develop a model in which information about a rm
 's value can be obtained\nfrom two sources: (i) vo
 luntary disclosure by a rm's manager\, if she is i
 nformed\, and (ii) an exogenous source - news - wi
 th uncertain accuracy\, i.e.\, who may be real or 
 fake. We focus on the case where the accuracy of t
 he news is positively correlated with the manager'
 s information endowment\, and the manager makes th
 e disclosure decision without knowing the news. In
  contrast to the existing theoretical literature\,
  our model does not admit a pure-strategy disclosu
 re equilibrium. Instead\, the equilibrium is chara
 cterized by two thresholds: an informed manager ne
 ver discloses values below the lower threshold\, a
 lways discloses values above the higher threshold\
 , and employs a mixed strategy with a monotonicall
 y increasing probability of disclosure for values 
 between the two thresholds. We show that the prese
 nce of news crowds out managerial disclosure.
LOCATION:W2.01\, CJBS
CONTACT:Cerf Admin
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