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CATEGORIES:CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar
SUMMARY:Ways of worldfaking - Boaz Miller (Zefat Academic 
 College)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230222T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230222T143000
UID:TALK196321AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/196321
DESCRIPTION:Deepfakes\, namely\, algorithmically created reali
 stic images and ‎videos that make it appear as if 
 people did something they didn't\, undermine our f
 undamental epistemic standards and practices. Yet 
 the nature of the epistemic threat they pose remai
 ns elusive. After all\, fictional or distorted rep
 resentations of reality are as old as cinema. Exis
 ting accounts of technology as extending the sense
 s (Humphreys 2004)\, mediating between subjects an
 d the world (Verbeek 2011)\, or translating betwee
 n actants (Latour 2005) cannot characterize this t
 hreat. Existing concrete accounts of the threat of
  deepfakes by social epistemologists such as Regin
 a Rini (2020) and Don Fallis (2020) fall short of 
 their target.\n\nEmploying the notions of artifact
  affordance and technological possibility (Record 
 2013\; Davis 2020)\, I argue that the epistemic th
 reat of deepfakes (and CGI more generally) is that
  for the first time they afford ordinary computer 
 users the practicable possibility to fairly cheapl
 y and effortlessly make fictional worlds indisting
 uishable from the real world. Normatively\, a deep
 fake is epistemically malignant when (1) a reasona
 ble person is misled to believe that the fictional
  world is the actual world\; (2) she forms beliefs
  about the actual world about issues that are mora
 lly or epistemically important. For example\, a sa
 tirical deepfake of Queen Elizabeth dancing to hip
 -hop song is benign because a reasonable person un
 derstands this is fiction. But a deepfake of a mis
 ogynic speech by Obama is malignant because it mis
 leads a reasonable person about Obama's views of w
 omen. I illustrate how this analysis generalizes t
 o other case studies\, such as a Photoshop makeove
 r\, or a QAnon discussion group.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philoso
 phy of Science
CONTACT:Jacob Stegenga
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