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CATEGORIES:CERF and CF Events
SUMMARY:The Rise of Anti-Activist Poison Pills - Ofer Elda
 r (Duke University)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20230223T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20230223T141500
UID:TALK175190AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/175190
DESCRIPTION:We provide the first systematic evidence of contra
 ctual innovation in the terms of poison pill plans
 . In response to the increase in hedge fund activi
 sm\, pills have changed to include anti-activist p
 rovisions\, such as low trigger thresholds and act
 ing-in-concert provisions. Using unique data on he
 dge fund views of SEC filings as a proxy for the t
 hreat of activists' interventions\, we show that h
 edge fund interest predicts pill adoptions. Moreov
 er\, the likelihood of a 13D filing declines after
  firms adopt "anti-activist" pills\, suggesting th
 at pills are effective in deterring activists. The
  results are particularly strong for "NOL" pills t
 hat\, due to tax laws\, have a five percent trigge
 r. Our analysis has implications for understanding
  the modern dynamics of market discipline of manag
 ers in public corporations and evaluating policies
  that regulate defensive tactics.
LOCATION:CJBS\, room W2.02 
CONTACT:Daniel Simmons
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