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CATEGORIES:Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of
  Science
SUMMARY:Causal explanation and revealed preferences - Kate
  Vredenburgh (London School of Economics)
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T153000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211125T170000
UID:TALK163138AThttp://talks.cam.ac.uk
URL:http://talks.cam.ac.uk/talk/index/163138
DESCRIPTION:"Register to attend in person":https://www.eventbr
 ite.co.uk/e/hps-departmental-seminar-tickets-19647
 6595787\n\nRevealed preference approaches to model
 ling choice in the social sciences face seemingly 
 devastating predictive\, explanatory\, and normati
 ve objections. In this talk\, I will focus on pred
 ictive and explanatory objections\, and offer two 
 defences. First\, I argue that when revealed prefe
 rences are multiple realizable\, revealed preferen
 ces can causally explain behaviour well. But\, con
 siderations of multiple realizability open the rev
 ealed preference theorist to an equally plausible 
 interpretation of these models\, that they pick ou
 t a coarse grained psychological disposition. Seco
 nd\, I argue that when agential preferences cannot
  be easily analytically separated from the environ
 ment that produces the relevant behaviour\, reveal
 ed preferences also causally explain\, if one adop
 ts a counterfactual dependence account of causal e
 xplanation. An upshot of these two arguments is an
  explanatory argument against a unified dispositio
 nal interpretation of 'preference'.
LOCATION:Mill Lane Lecture Room 9 and Zoom
CONTACT:Richard Staley
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