University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Optimization and Incentives Seminar > Competition for resources - The equilibrium existence problem in congestion games

Competition for resources - The equilibrium existence problem in congestion games

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Weighted congestion games are an important class of noncooperative games that constitute an elegant model for the resource usage by selfish users, i.e. in traffic networks. Unfortunately, they need not possess a pure Nash equilibrium, in general. We give a complete characterization of the maximal sets of cost functions that guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. Further implications of this characterization are discussed.

This talk is part of the Optimization and Incentives Seminar series.

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