Do mathematical explanations impose a necessity on the natural world?

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• Aditya Jha (Department of History and Philosophy of Science)
• Wednesday 22 October 2025, 13:00-14:30
• Seminar Room 2, Department of History and Philosophy of Science.

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Matt Farr.

Do some physical facts have a mathematical, as opposed to causal, explanation, and do these physical facts obtain from a degree of (mathematical) necessity stronger than that of contingent causal laws? In this talk, I focus on an influential account of mathematical explanations by Marc Lange, and argue that purported mathematical explanations are actually causal explanations in disguise. I show that such explanations are no different from ordinary applications of mathematics, as they work not by appealing to what the world must be like as a matter of mathematical necessity but by appealing to various contingent causal facts.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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